Credit channel of monetary transmission by Denisova, Irina
This project (No 97-292) was supported
by the Economics Education and Research Consortium
Research area: Macro & Finance
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author and not those of 
the Economics Education and Research Consortium. 
Research dissemination by the EERC may include views on policy, 
but the EERC itself takes no institutional policy positions
© Economics Education and Research Consortium 2000
© I.A. Denisova 2000
Credit Channel 
of Monetary Transmission
The Role of Industrial Interenterprise Arrears
Irina Denisova
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o  9 9 / 1 2
CONTENTS
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 5
1. INTRODUCTION 8
2. A TWO-SECTOR MODEL 12
2.1. The structure of the model 12
2.2. Short-run equilibrium 14
2.3. The model with symmetric credit rationing 18
2.4. Long-run equilibrium 25
3. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 30
APPENDICES 35
A. Tables 35
B. List of variables used in the model 37
C. First-order conditions 38
D. Two-sector model with credit rationing (without arrears) 41
E. Proofs 44
REFERENCES 49
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 5
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Many economic processes observed in Russia are similar to those in the
transitional economies of Eastern Europe. However, the depth and
length of Russia's output decline, together with its persistently high in-
flation have proved to be a challenge to explain
The existing literature on the output collapse (see, e.g., Bruno (1992),
Kornai (1994), Calvo and Kumar (1994), Granville (1995), Blanchard
(1996), Sachs (1996b)) offers at least three general causes.
One set of explanations is associated with the shock of systemic trans-
formation and the legacy of planning (e.g., the change from supply-
determined to demand-determined markets; the deep changes in the
structure of relative prices following liberalization; and the disruption of
coordination mechanisms during the movement away from central plan-
ning toward markets).
A second group of explanations focus on the influence of two macro
shocks: the external trade shock from the dismantling of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the dissolution of the USSR,
which diminished both demand for products and input availability; and
the post-Cold-War shock, which changed the structure of domestic de-
mand following demilitarization.
A third set of explanations may be called policy-induced causes, since
they are associated more with specific policy characteristics than those
in the first two groups. One area of focus is trade liberalization, which
increased international competition. Another is the sharp reduction in
governmental subsidies (explicit and implicit), as well as centralized in-
vestment and defense spending. And a third is the monetary contrac-
tion.
Recognizing the significance of all the three groups of factors, we focus
on the possible channels through which monetary policy contributed to
the output decline in Russia. We believe that the decline related to the
monetary contraction may be significant, given the underdevelopment of
the credit market.
It is hardly possible to judge whether or not monetary policy can impose
real costs on a transitional economy without proper understanding of
transmission mechanisms. The underdevelopment of the financial sector
alters the propagation mechanisms of monetary impulses. Given the un-
derdevelopment of capital markets in Russia, the lending channel of
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monetary policy transmission (modified in the context of a transitional
economy) appears to be dominant at the initial stages of transition,
whereas the interest rate and (traditional) exchange rate channels are
likely to become significant only after the government Treasury bills'
(GKO) market has developed; the so-called other asset price and bal-
ance sheet effects are hardly observable at all.
The lending channel, which is likely to remain the main channel in the
initial stages of transition, is significantly modified in comparison with the
one in developed economies, since credit extenders and recipients are
quite different. On the supply side, the lack of adequate substitutes for
loans from the CBR intensifies the decline in the supply of credit during
periods of monetary tightening. On the demand side the lack of substi-
tutes for bank loans other than trade credit deepens the enterprise side
reaction.
Interenterprise arrears, being a "cushion" for enterprises in periods of
tight liquidity, but not a perfect substitute for bank credit, complicate the
monetary impulse propagation. We examine the role of interenterprise
arrears using a two-sector (energy vs manufacturing) non-Walrasian
general equilibrium model with price regulation and credit rationing.
According to the model, when the credit limit to a sector is relaxed, the
sector's payment ratio increases, thus facilitating the other sector's
production. The resulting steady-state inflation is not symmetric across
the sectors: it increases if the first (energy) sector receives additional
credit, and decreases if the credit is extended to the consumption good
producer. If compared with the model without arrears, it turns out that
interenterprise arrears may soften or strengthen the production-side re-
action in the steady state, depending on respective elasticities. The lat-
ter is likely to depend on the characteristics of the production function
and the transaction cost function, and the level of real money balances.
The model allows one to explain the sectoral pattern of decline, as well
as the observed first three1 waves of arrears. The model suggests that
the depth of the recession in Russian industry, and its sectoral pattern,
may partially be explained by the policy of excessive credit rationing,
especially of the manufacturing sector. The model highlights the
mechanisms through which policy, meant to fight inflation, could cause
an increase in inflation together with a decline in both sectors' output
and consumption.
                                               
1  The first wave followed the initial money balances reduction, the second ap-
peared after real interest rates became positive, and the third one after the gov-
ernment increased its borrowing on GKO market.
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 7
The model suggests that a relaxation of the credit rationing constraint to
the second sector, and/or a decrease in interest rates, may be growth
promoting strategies, and the former may even not result in higher infla-
tion, implying that there is a rationale for governmental intervention.
Overall, it is likely that monetary policy, along with other factors, has
added to the depth of the observed output decline in Russia from 1992
to 96. The sectoral pattern of the recession seems to have been influ-
enced by the monetary impulse as well. The role of the CBR during the
first years of transformation, when the new bank system was weak and
unable to create credit resources on a scale required by an economy
with a high share of industrial production, continues to be dominant. The
transfer of responsibilities to the weak financial system resulted in a lack
of liquid financial assets in the system, which was later translated into an
extremely high interest rate on money resources and the outburst of
quasi-money.
CREDIT CHANNEL OF MONETARY TRANSMISSION8
1. INTRODUCTION
Many economic processes observed in Russia have been similar to
those in the transitional economies of Eastern Europe. However, the
reasons for the depth and the length of its transformational recession,
together with its persistently high inflation, have been difficult for
economists to pin down.
There are a variety of reasons for output decline that have been recog-
nized in the transitional economics literature (see, e.g., Bruno (1992),
Kornai (1994), Calvo and Kumar (1994), Polterovich (1995a), Blanchard
(1996), Sachs (1996), Gomulka (1998)). Recognizing the significance of
many other factors, we will focus on the possible channels through
which monetary policy may have influence the output decline in Russia.
It is likely that the portion of the output collapse related to the monetary
contraction may be significant.
There is no agreement in the academic literature about the relationship
between the tightening of monetary policy from 1992 – 1996, the output
decline, and the role of interenterprise arrears. Some authors believe
that widespread interenterprise credit is a normal substitute for banking
credit, and there is no special "arrears' problem" in the Russian econ-
omy since the ratio of trade credit to GDP is not abnormal by interna-
tional standards (Alfandari and Schaffer (1996)). However, this view can
be challenged on a number of grounds.
First, it is difficult to evaluate what is a normal level of trade credit, and
particularly, overdue trade credit. In an economy in transition a large
part of the stock reflects uncollectible receivables from firms that will
never pay. Moreover, the tradable value of a Russian receivable is much
lower than in an economy with a developed capital market.
Second, it seems incorrect to discuss the level of trade credit in an
economy in isolation from other indicators, the level of bank credit in
particular. In Russia, the ratio of total trade credit to GDP is twice the
level of total banking credit. Total trade credit (receivables and pay-
ables) in Russia in 1994 – 1997 was 30 – 40% of annualized GDP (47%
in 1996). Overdue trade credit amounted to about 20%, not an excep-
tional amount relative to international standards. Total domestic credit to
the private sector was only about 10 – 15% of GDP during the same
period. By comparison, the ratio of total trade credit to bank credit to
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the private sector was 0.5 in Canada and the USA and 0.33 in the UK2,
suggesting that it is hardly possible to evaluate the level of trade credit
in Russia as normal. The level of trade credit in Russia is comparable to
that in Poland, which is believed to have experienced output losses fol-
lowing credit contraction (Calvo and Coricelli (1993)).
Moreover, with internal finance being dominant, bank loans are impor-
tant in corporate finance for developed economies, with their share in
gross financing varying from 13% in Canada to more than 40% in
France and Japan. In most developed countries, trade credit is only the
fourth most important source of finance, after internal resources, bank
loans and securities. Exceptions include Finland and Japan where secu-
rities are relatively less important (see Calvo and Kumar (1993): Appen-
dix Table 1, p. 30; Mayer (1991): Table 12.3, p. 312).
The financing pattern of Russian industrial enterprises differs sharply.
Interenterprise trade credit is the dominant source of short-term finance
of industrial enterprises. Payables to suppliers accounted for almost
50% of total industrial enterprises' liabilities in 1993 – 1995, with about
half being overdue, whereas banking credit and internal financial re-
sources (real money balances and securities holdings) accounted for
roughly 20% and 15% of total liabilities, respectively (Table A1 in Ap-
pendix).
It is almost impossible to evaluate whether monetary policy has real
costs without properly understanding the transmission mechanisms in a
transitional economy. The general underdevelopment of financial mar-
kets in transitional economies, and money and credit markets in par-
ticular, together with widespread interenterprise arrears, are likely to
distort the monetary transmission mechanisms and, if not taken into ac-
count, make monetary policy unreliable and less effective.
The objective of this paper is to clarify the role of interenterprise arrears
in the propagation mechanism. Additionally, we will try to understand
whether monetary issues, and the credit regime in particular, could have
affected the sectoral pattern of the industrial recession.
It is generally accepted that monetary policy can have a significant influ-
ence on real economic variables in the short run, although the propaga-
tion mechanisms for any monetary impulse are debated. There are four
major types of monetary channels in a developed economy recognized
                                               
2  Author's calculations based on International Financial Statistics (1997: pp 572–
575) for Russia and International Financial Statistics (1996: pp 166, 222, 254,
506, 638, 642) for the rest of the countries. Trade credit data is from Alfandari
and Schaffer (1996): pp 104–105.
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in literature (see, e.g., Mishkin (1995a) for an overview): the interest
rate channel, originally associated with the basic Keynesian IS-LM
model; the exchange rate channel, operating through net exports; the
so called "other asset price effects"; and the credit channel. The latter
stresses the influence of imperfect information in financial markets and,
in particular, the fact that informational asymmetries result in equilibrium
credit rationing (Kashyap et al. (1993), Bernanke and Blinder (1992)).
Denisova (1997) shows that given the under-development of the stock
market in Russia, the lending channel of monetary policy transmission
appears to have been dominant during the initial stages of transition,
whereas the interest rate and exchange rate channels are likely to have
become significant only after 1995 and the development of the market
for government Treasury bills (GKO and OFZ); the other asset price and
balance sheet effects are hardly observable at all.
The lending channel of monetary policy transmission appears to have
been intensified by Russia's weak private banking system and the ab-
sence of substitutes for the CBR's loanable funds, on the supply side3,
and the lack of substitutes for bank loans, other than trade credit, on
the demand side.
Can arrears provide an adequate substitute for banking credit? As
shown in the literature on transitional economics, there are several fea-
tures that distinguish interenterprise arrears from trade credit in a mar-
ket economy. First, there is a large involuntary component of holding
arrears, since there is practically no possibility to recover them legally.
Second, interest rates on arrears are very low. Third, the degree of
mutual indebtedness is very high.4
Since arrears are practically interest-free, may be they are even a better
source of short-term finance than banking credit? What is the effect the
institution of arrears on growth and inflation in the context of a transi-
tional economy characterized by the dominance of short-term interests,
the continued regulation of certain prices (e.g., on energy products in
                                               
3  Relative to those in developed countries, the assets of Russian banks are
characterized by a high share of reserves and claims on the government. A lack
of securities, together with lower shares of deposits and money market instru-
ments, are the major differences on the liability side. Relative to banks in other
transitional economies, the main distinction is the lower share of centralized re-
sources (i.e., credit from monetary authorities and government deposits)
(Denisova (1997): Table 4, p. 38–39).
4  It is not that large firms extend trade credit to credit rationed small firms like it
happens in market economies. It is rather a complex network of mutual arrears.
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Russia), and the separation between household and enterprise money?
To clarify the role of arrears in monetary transmission, an analytical
framework is needed.
There are few studies that deal with the problem of interenterprise ar-
rears itself, and fewer attempts at formally modeling how the mecha-
nism of arrears affects transmission (Blinder (1987), Granville et al.
(1996), Kim and Kwan (1995)).
The model suggested below may be considered a counterpart of the
one in (Granville et al. (1996)), where the credit regime under which the
interest rate plays the allocative role was studied. The model is simpli-
fied to exclude competition from an imported good. The framework pro-
vides an opportunity to trace the influence of different policies on real
production and inflation in the complex environment of a transitional
economy. In particular, by emphasizing the transactional role of liquid
assets, the framework allows one to consider the real effects of mone-
tary tightening and the shift to quasi-money (arrears). Distinguishing
between two sectors — an energy sector and a manufacturing sector —
helps one to clarify those factors that determine the dynamics of the
sectoral pattern of output.
The introduction of credit rationing into the model changes several rela-
tionships between variables and, according to the results of comparative
statics' analysis, allows one to draw stronger conclusions about the in-
fluence of credit tightening on output and inflation than were possible in
(Granville et al. (1996)). In addition, the existence of two monetary cir-
cuits5 is taken into account.
                                               
5  Enterprises still face strict regulations on converting non-cash accounts into
cash. This is a legacy of the planning era.
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2. A TWO-SECTOR MODEL
2.1. The structure of the model
We consider five economic sectors in the economy: an energy sector, a
manufacturing sector, a banking sector, a household sector and a gov-
ernment sector. There are two domestically produced goods. The econ-
omy's real flows are presented in Fig. 1. The exhaustive list of variables
used in the model is presented in Appendix B.
The first sector produces energy resources (f), a portion of which are
used as working capital by the second sector (y). The remainder is ex-
Government
g, p
Bank
Exports
Sector I
f(x, m1,z1)
Sector II
h(y, m2,z2)
Consumer
U(c, m)
x, p
f
y, q
ξ, q0
d, p
h, p
c, p
cr1
cr2
Figure 1. Real flows in the modeled economy.
Exogenous variables: q, R, ε, q0 , g, θ,  cr1, cr2, M0.
Endogenous variables: x, m1, z1, f, y, m2, z2, h, c, m, ξ, d, p.
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ported6 (ξ). The second sector produces the manufactured good (h),
which is demanded as working capital by the first sector (x) and as a
consumption good by households (c) and the government (g).
The price of energy, q, is regulated and is exogenously fixed for a pe-
riod.7 The price of the manufactured good, p, is determined by supply
and demand.
The banking sector decides upon the interest rate (R) and credit limits
to the first sector (Cr1) and to the second sector (Cr2). The bank sec-
tor's behavior is not modeled explicitly.8 We assume these values to be
exogenously given.
Working capital is assumed to be the only physical input in the produc-
tion process. The transactional role of money is taken into account by
introducing real money balances into the production function. It is as-
sumed that money balances can be increased only from the external
source of banking credit.
To reflect the widespread interenterprise arrears we will use the pro-
duction function modification9 proposed by Victor Polterovich in
(Granville et al. (1996)). In terms of the first sector variables, the pro-
duction function is of the form: ),z)m/z(x()x()z,m,x(f 11111 µ−Ω=Ω=
                                               
6  It is assumed that the world price of energy resources is higher than the do-
mestic one: εq0 > q. Therefore, exports would be attractive for producers but
they are subject to quotas, and the restriction is binding. Consequently, the first
sector does not choose the amount of ξ , which is exogenously given to the pro-
ducer. The export quota ξ is determined residually in the model: given the exo-
genously determined price q, it is the difference between production f and do-
mestic demand y, i.e. yf −=ξ .
7  Exports, in the form in which they are introduced, offer a way to escape diffi-
culties of modeling imbalances in the market for the first good, given that the
price on the good is fixed. Exports can be viewed as a premium available for
producers after satisfying domestic demand. In this sense, the economy is effec-
tively a closed one.
8  There is no intertemporal optimization in the model, and thereby no explicit
motive for savings. This restricts the role of the banking system in the model,
but — to repeat — the actual size of bank credits is extremely low in the private
sector. Russian banks are much more active on the market for government
bonds, which we do not want to consider in the model.
9  A more standard production function, such as Cobb–Douglas, is too "rigid" to
capture some important empirically-supported relationships (e.g., the depend-
ence of the optimal payment ratio (defined below) on the level of the money bal-
ances available to producer).
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where x is working capital, m1 represents real money balances, z1 is
working capital paid for, µ is a transaction cost function, and x is actual
(i.e. adjusted for transaction costs) working capital.
The key point is that there are transaction costs of buying a unit of
working capital, which are decreasing with higher levels of real money
balances. Costs increase in the amount of the input bought, which
makes payment arrears attractive. Actual working capital used in pro-
duction ( x ) is less than the working capital demanded by the amount of
transaction costs.
Assume further that there is a penalty for having arrears. The penalty for
a unit of arrears decreases when the payment ratio, defined as
,x/z1=γ  increases. The penalty function ϕ is assumed to approach in-
finity when payments are zero. When real money balances fall below a
certain critical level it becomes profitable to have payment arrears even
if there is a penalty for holding overdue trade credit.10
It is possible to think about the suggested setting in terms of the transi-
tional economy's analogue of the external finance premium. In periods
of credit tightening, and therefore a squeeze on the real money bal-
ances of enterprises, the wedge between the cost of running trade
credit arrears and borrowing on the credit market increases in favor of
trade credit arrears.
Informational aspects of the interenterprise arrears problem in a transi-
tional economy are beyond our consideration, and complete information
is assumed.
2.2. Short-run equilibrium
Producers decide upon actual inputs x  and y , and thus outputs f and
h, for one period. In the presence of transaction costs and the possibil-
ity of not paying for the input in full, producers choose both the amount
of working capital (x) they want to get from the other sector and the
amount of working capital they intend to pay for (z1), together with the
level of real money balances they want to have to facilitate the purchase
of the input (m1). Since the money balances can be increased only by
borrowing from the bank, producers need to pay interest on the credit
they obtain. Producers must also pay a penalty for having arrears, which
is transferred to the other sector. Hence, the first (energy) sector's ob-
                                               
10  The condition for the payment ratio to be strictly less than 1 is derived in the
model.
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jective function can be written in the following way (where the last term
is the penalty payment from the second sector transferred to the first
sector):
,mmm,
p
Cr
m.t.s
,y)1)(1(qmRpzp)zx)(zx(p
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)zy)(zy(qmRppz)zx)(zx(p
])z,m,x(f[qqmax
)z,m,x(max
1101
1
1
1111
11
0
z,m,x
2121111
11
0
z,m,x
11
z,m,x
11
11
11
∆+=≤∆
β−βϕ+∆−−−ϕ−
−ξ−β+ξε=
=−ϕ+∆−−−ϕ−
−ξ−β+ξε=
=∆Π
∆
∆
∆
(1)
where β is the second sector payment ratio, i.e. the ratio of paid for to
total demanded input β = z2/y. Given that ξ and β are exogenous for the
first sector and assuming that ∂β*/∂γ = 0 (γ = z1/x), the first sector's
objective function is equivalent to:
.mRppz)zx)(zx(p)z,m,x(fqmax 111111
z,m,x 11
∆−−−ϕ−β
∆
(1')
The second (manufacturing) sector's problem is symmetric to the first
sector's if we assume )z)mz(y()y()z,m,y(h 22222 µ−Ω=Ω= . The only
difference is that the second sector's product is demanded not only by
the first sector as working capital, but also as a consumption good by
households and the government. The existence of payment arrears from
the first sector is equivalent to a price reduction on the second sector's
good (in comparison with the price charged to households and the gov-
ernment). For the sake of simplicity11, let us assume that price arbitrage
will result in equalizing the two prices (pc = γp)12 so that we can write
                                               
11  This assumption allows us to avoid introducting an extra variable that would
reflect the second sector's choice of the fraction of its output sold to each of the
two groups of customers.
12  The presence of government arrears, reflecting the bargaining power of the
government, allows it to drive the price for a unit of the second good to the lower
bound (i.e., the result of arbitrage is not that γ = 1, but that pc < p).
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the manufacturing sector problem as:
,mmm,q/Crm.t.s
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where γ is the second sector payment ratio, i.e. γ = z1/x. Given that γ is
exogenous for the second sector and assuming that ∂γ*/∂β  =  0
(β = z2/y), the second sector's objective function is equivalent to:
.mRqzq)zy)(zy(q)z,m,y(hpmax 222222
z,m,x 11
∆−−−ϕ−γ
∆
(2')
The household sector decides upon demands for the consumption good
and real money balances so as to maximize utility. The introduction of
real money balances in the utility function is meant to capture the trans-
actional role of money. A consumer's income comes from two sources:
net of taxes profits13 and money from the previous period. Savings are
made in the form of holding money balances, which can be thought of
as interest-free accounts at a bank.14
The consumer's problem can be written as:
.pMm
,Mq)1(dp)1(I
,IMpc.t.s
,)m,c(U
0
0
m,c
max
=
+ξεθ−+γθ−=
=+ (3)
There are three balance conditions in the economy, which reflect the
flows of physical goods:
yf +ξ= ,    xdh += ,   cgd += . (4)
                                               
13  What is called profit in the model is actually value-added, since we do not
separate between wages and profits.
14  This assumption is consistent with the fact that in 1992 and during the begin-
ning of 1993 interest rates on private savings in Sberbank were far below infla-
tion. However, we do not consider substitution into hard currency and dollar de-
nominated accounts, which were common practices at the time.
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It is worth noting that government expenditures g are financed via reve-
nues from the profit tax, seigniorage and the gain in the price due to the
existence of payment arrears15:
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where ∆m = (M – M0)/p.
The money market equilibrium is determined by the following condi-
tions16:
.CrM
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(6)
The short-run equilibrium trajectory is a sequence of static equilibria in
periods t = 1, 2, ...
A static equilibrium is the set {x*, ∗1z , 
∗
1m , f*, ξ*, y*, ∗2z , ∗2m , h*, β*, γ*,
c*, m*, p*} such that:
1) x*, ∗1z , 
∗
1m , f* are the first sector value-added maximizing choices,
given prices p* and q, the nominal interest rate R, the credit limit Cr1
and the second sector payment ratio β*;
                                               
15  (5) is easy to check using the consumer's budget constraint and the balance
condition d = g + c.
16  Since banking system behavior is not modeled explicitly, this setting (in the
case of binding credit limits) is equivalent to putting limits on the growth of the
money supply. The latter would mean that supply of money is exogenous, while
the sum of credit limits to the sectors is determined residually: Cr1 + Cr2 =
∆Ms – ∆Md. There is no difference between the two schemes in the case of
binding credit limits. When credit limits are not binding, it is assumed that the in-
terest rate (which is exogenous in our framework) is such that money supply is
equal to money demand from consumers and the banking system (the latter be-
ing equal to demand from producers).
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2) y*, ∗2z , 
∗
2m , h* are the second sector value-added maximizing
choices, given prices p* and q, the nominal interest rate R, the credit
limit Cr2 , and the first sector payment ratio γ*;
3) β* and γ* constitute a Nash equilibrium with a Cournot-type conjec-
tural variation assumption, i.e. γ* is the first sector optimal payment
ratio given the second sector optimal choice β* and assuming
∂β*/∂γ = 0; and β* is the second sector optimal payment ratio given
the first sector optimal choice γ* and assuming ∂γ*/∂β = 0;
4) c*, m* are the consumer's utility maximizing choice, given prices p*,
q, total profits Π*, the tax rate θ and initial money balances M0;
5) ∗)q/p(  is the second product market clearing price ratio, i.e. such
that ))q/p((x))q/p((h))q/p((cg ∗∗∗∗∗∗ −=+ , where q is exogenously
given;
6) ξ* is export quota in equilibrium: ξ* = f* – y*.
Given the assumptions made about the functions f, h, ϕ, µ and U, and
assuming that the substitution effect caused by the price ratio change is
stronger than the income effect, an equilibrium exists and is unique.
2.3. The model with symmetric credit rationing
Two credit regimes can be identified in Russia. In 1992 – 1993 the real
interest rate was substantially negative, and credit was rationed. Since
1994 the real interest rate has become positive, and comprehensive
credit rationing has stopped. However, there are indications of selective
credit rationing aimed at overcoming adverse selection and moral haz-
ard problems.
From this perspective it is likely that industrial sectors, which are sub-
stantially non-symmetric in their financial positions (e.g., the share of
the fuel sector in total industrial profits was about 20 – 25% in 1992 –
1994 (Belousov and Klepach (1995): Table 1, p. 55)), may be treated
differently by banks. Banks are typically more reluctant to lend to
manufacturing sector enterprises, which are much less competitive on
the world market than energy sector companies. The fact that the share
of overdue bank credit (both as a percentage of GDP, and as a per-
centage of total credit extended to the sector) is higher in the manu-
facturing sector than in the energy sector (Table A1 in Appendix), may
also suggest that banks would try to monitor firms in the manufacturing
sector, and thereby practice credit rationing. Firms in the energy sector
are less likely to experience additional restrictions.
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The empirical analysis of industrial data for 1994 – 1995 presented in
Denisova (1997) indicates that there is a substantial asymmetry in fi-
nancing patterns between industrial sectors: the energy sector behavior
regarding bank credit is governed by the real interest rate, whereas the
manufacturing sector appears to be credit rationed. Overdue trade
credit is likely to exert little influence on the energy sector's output dy-
namics, while it is important for the manufacturing sector. It seems rea-
sonable to take into account the observed asymmetry between the
sectors in the model, that would allow one to analyze the influence of
different patterns of short-term finance on the variance in output decline
across the sectors.
To reflect the two credit regimes, we will analyze two versions of the
model: both sectors are credit rationed (the first version); the energy
sector is not credit rationed, while the manufacturing sector is rationed17
(the second version). Formally, depending on different credit regimes,
we will allow:
• ∆mi = cri, i.e. the credit constraint is binding for producer i and there
is credit rationing;
• ∆mi < cri, i.e. the constraint is not binding for producer i and there is
no credit rationing.
The model with symmetric credit rationing is analyzed in Section 2.3.1
(short-run version) and Section 2.4.1 (long-run version), while the model
with asymmetric credit rationing is presented in Section 2.4.2 (long-run
version).
To simplify the analysis, we will assume in what follows that the produc-
tion function, the transaction cost function and the penalty function have
the following forms18:
).1,0(,)1,0(,k)(,a)(,b)( ∈σ∈αλ=λϕλ=λµλ=λΩ σνα
2.3.1. Short-run comparative statics. With the above parametriza-
tion and under the credit rationing regime, the first sector (energy pro-
                                               
17  Here we assume that the microfoundation for credit rationing of one of the
sectors is that credit rationing of enterpises (as an optimal strategy for banks
given the informational asymmetries they face (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)) occurs
more frequently in the manufacturing sector than in the energy sector.
18  The constraints on α and σ guarantee that the objective function is strictly
concave in terms of the payment ratio γ, and thus first order conditions give a
maximum of the objective function, and the optimum is unique.
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ducer) problem can be stated as:
.mmm;crm.t.s
,crRppz)zxzx(pk)mazx(bqmax
110111
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11
1
1
1
1
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(7)
The second sector problem is symmetric. The first-order conditions for
producers' problems are derived in Appendix C. It is worth noting that
the FOCs are derived in terms of γ and β (the endogenously determined
ratio of sector input paid for). Under certain constraints on parameters,
the optimal payment ratios are strictly less than 1. That is, γ* < 1 and
β* < 1, and it is optimal for the sectors not to pay for their inputs in full.
To study the influence of the exogenous variables on the short-term
equilibrium, it is convenient to define the supply and demand for the
second commodity in the following way:
)k,m,,,qp(x)k,m,,,qp(hdS 12 γβ−γβ==  and ( )qI,qpcgdD +== .
In addition, we can define the export function
.)k,m,,,qp(y)k,m,,,qp(f 21 γβ−γβ=ξ
The signs of the derivatives of the supply function and the export func-
tion are easily derived, using results on the signs of partial derivatives
presented in Table C1 in the Appendix, and the signs of the derivatives
of the demand function are discussed in Appendix E5.
S = S(p/q, β, γ, m1, m2, k);     ξ(p/q, β, γ, m1, m2, k);
           +   ?  ?  –    +   ?           –    ? ?  +    –    ?
(8)
D = D(g, p/q, ε/q, θ, M0/q, γ, β, k, cr1, cr2).
         +   –     +   –    +     ? ?  ?   +    –
The supply of the second good is an increasing function of the price ra-
tio (p/q) and the second sector credit limit, and a decreasing function of
the first sector credit limitation (cr1). The effects of the payment ratios (γ
and β) and the penalty function coefficient (k) are ambiguous. The de-
mand for the domestic consumption good depends positively on gov-
ernment expenditures in real terms (g), the real exchange rate (ε/q), the
first sector credit limit (cr1) and previous period real money balances19
                                               
19  This is a result of price rigidity.
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(M0/q). Demand is a negative function of the domestic price ratio (p/q),
the profit tax rate (θ) and the credit limit to the second sector in real
terms (cr2). The influence of the payment ratios (γ and β) and the pen-
alty function coefficient (k) are ambiguous.
Given that the static equilibrium is unique, we can trace out the effects
of changing exogenous parameters. The results are summarized in Ta-
ble 1.
An increase in g. An expansion of government expenditures shifts the
demand curve outwards (Fig. 2), with the supply curve unchanged. The
equilibrium price ratio (p/q)* and d* increase. The price ratio increase
raises the optimal first sector payment ratio γ and diminishes the second
sector ratio β. The change in the price ratio and the diminished payment
ratio of the second sector β result in a decrease of first sector output (f)
and of exports (ξ), while the second sector output (h) increases both as
a result of both the price ratio change and the first sector payment ratio
(γ) enlargement. Consumption c is likely to decrease (if the substitution
effect outweighs the income effect).
An increase in θ. An increase in the tax rate shifts the demand curve
inwards, with the supply curve unchanged. The resulting equilibrium
price ratio (p/q)* and d* are lower. The fall of the price ratio diminishes
the first sector payment ratio γ and increases the second sector ratio β.
The change in the price ratio and the increased payment ratio of the
Table 1. Sign changes of main variables in response to parameters' variation
(short-run comparative statics results).
Variable
Parameter
p/q x z1 f ξ y z2 h c
g + – – – – + + +
cr1 + ?↑ ?↑ ?↑ + + + –
cr2 – + + + ?↑ ?↑ ?↑ +
θ – + + + + – – – –
k
?↑ means that the influence is likely to be positive, provided that the effect of re-
laxing the credit limit is stronger than the relative price effect.
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second sector β cause the first sector output (f) and exports (ξ) to in-
crease, while the second sector output (h) falls as a result of both the
price ratio change and the first sector payment ratio (γ) decline. Since
government expenditures (g) are not changed, while d* diminishes,
consumption of the domestic good (c) decreases. The effect on m is
ambiguous because the change in income is ambiguous.
An increase in cr1. Relaxing the first sector credit limit shifts the sup-
ply curve leftwards. The demand curve shifts rightwards. The equilibrium
price ratio (p/q)* increases, while the change in d* is ambiguous. Given
that the marginal propensity to consume out of income is less than one,
one may conclude that the shift of the demand curve is of minor effect
in comparison with that of the supply curve (Fig. 3). The price ratio in-
crease raises the optimal first sector payment ratio γ and diminishes the
second sector ratio β. The relaxation of the first sector credit limit adds
to the increase of the payment ratio of the sector (γ).
The change in the price ratio and the diminished payment ratio of the
second sector β result in a decrease of the first sector's output (f) and
exports (ξ), while the increased real money balances of the first sector
facilitates both production and exports (via the increased γ). The overall
p/q1
p/q0
p/q
D0
D1
S
∗
0d
∗
1d d
Figure 2. Short-run effects of increased government expenditures.
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effects on f and ξ are ambiguous.20 The second sector's output (h) in-
creases as a result of both the price ratio change and the first sector
payment ratio (γ) enlargement. The second sector output (h) expands.
As government expenditures (g) are not changed, while d* diminishes,
consumption of the domestic good (c) will decrease. The effect on m is
ambiguous.
An increase in cr2. A relaxation of the second sector's credit limit
shifts the supply curve rightwards and the demand curve downwards.
The same argument about the marginal propensity to consume out of
income suggests that the shift in the demand curve is of minor effect
compared to that of the supply curve (Fig. 4). The equilibrium price ratio
(p/q)* decreases, while d* increases. The fall in the price ratio causes
the optimal first sector payment ratio γ to diminish and increases the
second sector ratio β. The relaxation of the second sector's credit limit
adds to the increase of the payment ratio of the sector (β).
                                               
20  If the credit rationing constraint is too restrictive, one could expect the effect
of relaxing the credit limits to outweigh the price ratio change. Indeed, if m1 is
small, ∂f/∂m1 is large. This could result in the expansion of the first sector's pro-
duction. The effect on exports will still be ambiguous.
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Figure 3. Short-run effects of relaxing the credit limit to the
first sector.
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The change in the price ratio and the increased payment ratio of the
second sector β cause the first sector output (f) and exports (ξ) to in-
crease, while the second sector output (h) tends to diminish as a result
of both the price ratio change and the first sector payment ratio (γ) de-
cline. However, the increased real money balances of the second sector
facilitates the production of the second good (via the increased β), and
thus causes exports to decline. The overall effects on h and ξ are am-
biguous.21 The first sector's output (f) expands. The unchanged gov-
ernment expenditures (g) allows consumption of the domestic good (c)
to increase. The effect on m is ambiguous.
An increase in k. The changes generated are ambiguous since the di-
rection of the shifts of both the supply and demand curves are ambigu-
ous.
                                               
21  If the credit rationing constraint is very restrictive, and therefore ∂h/∂m2 is
large, the effect of relaxing the credit limits may outweigh the price ratio influ-
ence, and thereby cause the second sector's production to increase. The change
in exports is ambiguous.
∗
0d
∗
1d d
Figure 4. Short-run effects of relaxing the credit limit to the
second sector.
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2.4. Long-run equilibrium
The dynamic version of the model is easily obtained from the static ver-
sion if we define time paths of the exogenous variables, since it is as-
sumed in the framework that the behavior of the economic agents is es-
sentially short-term-determined. The latter reflects the fact that the high
degree of economic and political uncertainty made them survival-
oriented and replaced intertermporal considerations with short-term
objectives.
Let us assume that tax rate θ and real credit limits to both sectors (cr1
and cr2) do not change over time22, while domestic (regulated) prices23
are changed with reference to the inflation rate. We will consider two
possibilities24:
• the first sector price and nominal exchange rate follow the second
sector price inflation with a one period lag, i.e.
1t1tt q)1(q −−π+= ,     1t1tt )1( −− επ+=ε . (9)
• the first sector price and nominal exchange rate are changed in line
with inflation in the second sector, i.e.
1ttt q)1(q −π+= ,        1ttt )1( −επ+=ε , (9')
where 1p/p 1ttt −=π − .
The nominal interest rate is known to be set so as to keep the real in-
terest rate constant: 1 + Rt = (1 + ρ)(1 + πt). The real interest rate ρ is
exogenously given. The indexation rules are known to all economic
agents.
It is also assumed that credit is extended for one period. The interest is
paid back in the next period and at the rate prevailing in period t+1. In
this case, expectations are important. For simplicity we will assume
perfect foresight: 1t
e
1t ++ π=π .
                                               
22  This is equivalent to assuming that in the steady-state the nominal credit limit
to a sector is growing with the rate of steady-state inflation.
23  This includes the nominal exchange rate.
24  It is shown in (Granville et al. (1996)) that these assumptions are consistent
with empirical data.
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The way arrears are introduced in the model has one major deficiency: it
is assumed that after the end of period t the accumulated trade credit
debt, equal to (xt – z1t) (in terms of the first sector) is not transferred to
the next period, and in this sense is never repaid. Therefore, it is rather
non-payment, and not trade credit or late payment. However, the as-
sumption that the penalty for running arrears is transferred to the other
sector is an indirect way of introducing trade credit repayment.25 The
implicit interest on trade credit in this case would depend on the pa-
rameters of the penalty function.26
2.4.1 The model with symmetric credit rationing. Under credit ra-
tioning t11t1t1 crmm += − , where tt1t1 p/Crcr = , and the interest rate
does not affect producers' decisions. Applying the first sector price in-
dexation rule (9) which, being traced to the initial period t = 0, becomes
01t1t1tt q~p...q)1(q −−− ==π+= , the first sector optimization problem can
be written as:
.mmm,crm.t.s
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Symmetrically, the second sector solves (with indexation rule (9)):
.mmm,crm.t.s
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The first order conditions for (10) and (11) are easily derived along the
lines discussed in Appendix C.
To take into account the existence of two separate monetary circuits in
the economy, assume that there is a one-period lag before profits be-
come household income. Assuming also that there are no transaction
                                               
25  Here we assume that trade credit debt is very short-term (less than a period),
and a certain amount of it (equal to the amount of the penalty) is repaid at the
end of the period.
26  Under the parametrization described, the implicit interest rate on trade credit
is equal to {pk(x/z1)
σ – 1}. With low k the implicit interest rate on trade credit
may be negative.
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costs of converting non-cash into cash27, the consumer's problem in the
dynamic case becomes:
.M)dpq)(1(I
,pMm,IMcp.t.s
,)m,c(Umax
1t1t1t1t1t
0
1tt
ttttttt
tt
m,c tt
−−−−−−
+γ+ξεθ−=
==+  (12)
We should mention here that the way we introduced two circuits28 in the
model implies a new source of finance for government expenditures g,
which are covered now via profit tax revenues, seigniorage, and inter-
mediator's profit.
The long-run equilibrium of the model is a steady-state trajectory (i.e.,
the equilibrium trajectory on which real variables do not change over
time), and prices change at a constant rate (i.e., the inflation rate is
constant: πt = πt+1 = π). Table 2 summarizes the results of the com-
                                               
27  The losses due to price changes between periods, "intermediator's profit",
are an exception.
28  Enterprises are allowed to use only non-cash, while households need cash.
Table 2. Signs of change of main variables in response to parameters' variation
(steady-state comparative statics). First indexation rule.
Variable
Parameter
π x z1 f y z2 h c
g + – – – + + + –
θ – + + + – – – –
k
Model with symmetric sectors
cr1 + ?↑ ?↑ ?↑ + + +
cr2 – + + + ?↑ ?↑ ?↑ +
Model with asymmetric sectors
cr2 – + + + ?↑ ?↑ ?↑ +
ρ – ?↓ ?↓ ?↓ – – –
?↑ means that the influence is likely to be positive, provided that the effect of re-
laxing the credit limit is stronger than the inflation effect.
?↓ means that the influence is likely to be negative, provided that the interest rate
effect is stronger than the inflation effect.
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parative static exercises (the last two rows are relevant for the model
with asymmetric sectors).
The long-run equilibrium trajectories depend significantly upon the ex-
ogenous variables' indexation rules. If the first sector price is altered in
line with the second sector price inflation (according to (9')), then
0t1ttt q~pq)1(q =π+= − .
Then the energy sector problem, for example, becomes:
.mmm,crm.t.s
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(13)
As a result, the FOCs for (13) (and for the second sector's problem as
well) are independent of inflation, and thereby the supply and export
functions do not depend on inflation whereas demand still does.
The steady-state comparative statics results under the second indexa-
tion rule (according to (9')) are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix
(the last two rows are relevant for the model with asymmetric sectors).
2.4.2 The Model with Asymmetric Credit Rationing. Let us suppose
that the first (energy) sector is not bound by a credit rationing con-
straint, which would mean that the demand for credit from the sector is
governed by the real interest rate (among other factors), whereas credit
to the second (manufacturing) sector is rationed. Expectations are im-
portant in this setting. For simplicity let us assume perfect foresight ex-
pectations: 1t
e
1t ++ π=π .
In this case the energy sector problem (long-run version) can be written
as:
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Applying the first indexation rule (9) and dividing by pt, we obtain:
.mmm,crm.t.s
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The second (manufacturing) sector's problem (under the first indexation
rule) stays the same:
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The supply function and demand in steady state depend on parameters
in the following manner:
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The above (17) suggests that the comparative static results will be the
same as in the case of credit rationing of the two sectors, except that
the real interest rate change will now have real effects. The results of
the steady-state comparative statics in the asymmetric sectors frame-
work can be found in Table 2 (the first indexation rule) and Table A2
(the second indexation rule).
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3. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The steady-state comparative statics suggests the following:
• An increase in government expenditures, though increasing the sec-
ond sector's output, results in a steady state with higher inflation and
diminished first sector production and export. The result is sensitive to
the price indexation rule: if the second rule is in operation, the outcome
would be increased inflation and crowding out of consumption, while
both sectors' levels of production and export would stay the same.
• An increase in the tax rate stimulates the first sector's production
and exports, and represses inflation. At the same time, the second
sector's output would diminish. If the second indexation rule is applied,
real variables would not change, while inflation would fall.
• If the credit limit to the first sector is relaxed (in the symmetric sec-
tors model), the new steady state would be characterized by higher in-
flation and lower consumption of the domestic good. At the same time,
the second sector's production would expand and, provided that the
credit rationing constraint is very restrictive and thereby the effect of its
relaxation large compared to the price change influence29, the first
sector's output would rise as well. The effect on exports is ambiguous.
The result is sensitive to the indexation rule: under the second rule, the
energy sector's production would expand, and exports would increase,
while the manufacturing sector's output would not change; inflation
would still accelerate, and consumption would diminish (as under the
first indexation rule).
• A relaxation of the credit limit to the second sector (in the symmetric
sectors case) would give the following results: the new steady state in-
flation would be lower, consumption of the domestic good would be
higher, energy sector output would expand, and the second sector's
output would possibly increase as well, provided that the effect of re-
laxing the credit limit outweighs the influence of the inflation ratio. The
changes in exports would be ambiguous. The result is again sensitive to
the indexation formula: if the second indexation rule is applied, the sec-
ond sector's output would expand, while exports would contract since
there would be no change in the first sector's production; inflation would
still decrease and consumption of the domestic good would still expand.
                                               
29  If, additionally, demand is rather elastic with respect to price changes, the
change in the price ratio itself would not be large.
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• A relaxation of the second sector credit limit in the model with
asymmetric sectors gives results similar to those mentioned above. The
only difference is that, under the first indexation rule, exports are likely
to expand, provided that the effect of relaxing the credit limit outweighs
the influence of the inflation ratio.
• An increase in real interest rates would lead to a decline in inflation
and increased consumption of the domestic good. At the same time, the
second sector's production would fall, and the first sector's output and
exports are likely to contract as well, provided that the interest rate ef-
fect is stronger than the inflation ratio's influence. Under the second in-
dexation rule, there would be a decline in the first sector's production
and exports, while there would be no change in the second sector. In-
flation would decrease, and consumption of the domestic good would
increase (as under the first indexation rule).
The first two comparative statics results are the same as in (Granville et
al. (1996)), though the mechanisms are slightly different, since the op-
timal payment ratios of the two sectors, γ* and β*, depend now (under
credit rationing) not only on the interest rate as in (Granville et al.
(1996)), but also on each other as well as the price ratio, real money
balances and the penalty coefficient. The latter results are quite original
(the interest rate influence was ambiguous in the model adopted in
Granville et al. (1996)).
Overall, it is likely that monetary policy, along with other factors, has
added to the depth of the observed recession in Russia from 1992 to96.
The sectoral pattern of the recession seems to have been influenced by
the monetary impulse as well. The role of the CBR during the first years
of transformation, when the new banking system was weak and unable
to create credit resources on a scale required by an economy with a
high share of industrial production, continues to be dominant. The
transfer of responsibilities to the weak financial system resulted in a lack
of liquid financial assets in the system. This was later translated into an
extremely high interest rate on money resources and the outburst of
quasi-money.
Interenterprise arrears, being a "cushion" for enterprises in periods of
tight liquidity, but not a perfect substitute for banking credit, complicate
the monetary impulse propagation. As the two-sector model shows, in-
terenterprise arrears are significant in the transmission mechanism:
when the credit limit to a sector is relaxed, the sector's payment ratio
increases, thus facilitating the other sector's production. The resulting
steady-state inflation is not symmetric across the sectors: it increases if
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the first (energy) sector receives additional credit, and decreases if the
credit is extended to the consumption good producer.
The economic intuition behind the sectoral asymmetry in terms of the
inflation that results from the relaxation of the credit limit is likely to be
related to the changes in the sources that finance government expen-
diture. According to the dynamic analogue of (5), government con-
sumption in the steady state is:
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When the credit limit to the first sector is relaxed (and inflation is not
changed yet), the payment ratio of the first sector (γ) increases, and
hence, demand for the input from the sector increases. The increase in
x causes the supply d = {h – x} to contract. As a result, tax revenues
decrease. Given the level of government expenditure g, the inflation tax
revenue substitutes for the reduction of "normal" tax finance. Given the
level of m30, the steady-state inflation rate needs to be increased.
Schematically:
cr1↑ ⇒ γ↑ ⇒ x↑, f↑ ⇒ d = {h – x}↓ ⇒ tax revenue ↓ ⇒
given the level of g,
the inflationary tax should be increased ⇒
⇒ given the level of m, inflation π↑.
When the credit limit to the second sector is relaxed (and inflation is not
changed yet), the payment ratio of the second sector (β) increases, and
hence, output of the sector increases. The increase in h causes the
supply d = {h – x} to expand. As a result, tax revenue increases. Given
the level of government expenditure g, the inflation tax revenue may be
reduced. Given the level of m, the steady-state inflation rate may be di-
minished. Schematically,
cr2 ↑ ⇒ β ↑ ⇒ y ↑, h ↑ ⇒ d = {h – x}↑ ⇒ tax revenue ↑ ⇒
⇒ given the level of g,
the inflationary tax should be decreased ⇒
⇒ given the level of m, inflation π↓.
It is shown in Appendix D that there is no difference in the direction of
change (under parameters' variation) in the model with payment arrears
                                               
30  Demand for real money balances from consumers is likely to decrease given
a decrease in income (which depends on d).
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relative to the model without arrears. However, the magnitude of the ini-
tiated changes in the two models may be different given the differences
in the mechanisms of transmission. It turns out that interenterprise ar-
rears may soften or strengthen the supply side reaction in the steady
state, depending on certain elasticities (see Appendix for details). The
latter is likely to depend on the characteristics of the production and
transaction cost functions and the level of real money balances. Empiri-
cal evidence, suggesting that money elasticity of arrears ratio (for both
sectors) is less than one (Denisova (1997)) appears to favor the "cush-
ioning" effect of arrears during the period.
How might we interpret the model's result that it is possible to simulta-
neously decrease inflation and raise output in light of the Phillips curve
tradeoff? The credit crunch, exerting an adverse influence on the supply
side of the economy, seems to have shifted the level of potential (long-
run equilibrium) output. As a result, the locus of the inflation-unemploy-
ment tradeoff (the Phillips curve) has shifted as well.31 When the credit
limit to the manufacturing sector is relaxed, the supply curve shifts
rightwards (reflecting an increase in potential output), which corre-
sponds to a leftward shift of the Phillips curve. Thus, in the absence of
(essentially inflationary) accommodative demand management policy,
the steady-state inflation may be reduced, while long-run equilibrium
output can increase. The sectoral asymmetry (in terms of inflation) of
the result seems to originate from the corresponding difference in gov-
ernment expenditure finance discussed above, and is on the demand
side of the conventional model.
Hence, the model provides an opportunity to trace the influence of dif-
ferent policies on real production and inflation in the complex environ-
ment of a transitional economy. In particular, by emphasizing the trans-
action role of liquid assets, the framework allows one to consider the
real effects of monetary tightening and the shift to quasi-money (ar-
rears). Distinguishing between the two sectors helps one to clarify those
factors that determine the dynamics of the sectoral pattern of output.
Moreover, the model suggests that the depth of the recession in Rus-
sian industry, and its sectoral pattern, may (along with other factors) be
explained by the policy of excessive credit rationing, especially of the
second sector.32 The model highlights the mechanisms through which
                                               
31  The subsequent shifts of the curve (following the changes in inflationary ex-
pectations, e.g.) are going to be "around" the new level of potential output.
32  The energy sector, having strong bargaining power in negotiations with the
government, is known to have better access to banking credit and government
subsidies. Real credit to the sector was increasing in 1994 – 1996.
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policy, meant to fight inflation, could cause increased inflation together
with a decline in both sectors' output and consumption.
The first (symmetric) version of the model seems to reflect the realities
of the Russian economy in 1992 – 1993, while the second (asymmetric)
version may be useful for discussing later developments. The model
suggests that a relaxation of the credit rationing constraint to the sec-
ond sector, and/or a decrease in interest rates, may be growth promot-
ing strategies, and the former may not even result in higher inflation,
implying that there is scope for governmental intervention.
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APPENDICES
A. Tables
Table A1. Short-term (liquid) assets and liabilities of industrial enterprises (% of
total short-term liabilities, end of month).
Assets Liabilities
Nov-93 Nov-94 Nov-95 Nov-93 Nov-94 Nov-95
Total industry
Total debtors 74.3 70.3 61.8 Total creditors 83.7 79.9 82.3
incl. in arrears 30.2 38.3 29.0 incl. in arrears 29.2 42.7 41.8
Receivables from
customers 60.7 57.0 48.0
Payables to
suppliers 52.3 48.7 43.3
incl. overdue 26.1 33.0 24.9 incl. overdue 21.3 27.6 19.8
Cash and bank
deposits 11.2 6.8 3.1
Payables to the
budget 11.1 14.4 17.6
incl. overdue 3.7 8.9 11.6Financial invest-
ment 2.4 5.3 7.6 Total bank credit 16.3 20.1 17.7
incl. overdue 1.2 2.4 2.0
Energy sector*
Total debtors 80.2 86.5 77.2 Total creditors 95.0 93.8 92.1
incl. in arrears 33.2 54.3 43.0 incl. in arrears 30.0 56.9 54.1
Receivables from
customers 63.9 72.0 63.7
Payables to
suppliers 55.5 57.9 49.4
incl. overdue 28.1 47.0 37.5 incl. overdue 20.6 35.8 25.8
Cash and bank
deposits 16.9 10.7 2.7
Payables to the
budget 19.6 21.4 23.1
incl. overdue 6.4 14.9 17.2Financial invest-
ment 2.5 6.7 9.6 Total bank credit 4.9 6.2 7.9
incl. overdue 0.2 0.5 0.5
Source: Author's calculations based on Goskomstat data.
* The energy sector is defined to include electricity and fuel sector.
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Table A1 continued from p. 35
Assets Liabilities
Nov-93 Nov-94 Nov-95 Nov-93 Nov-94 Nov-95
Manufacturing sector*
Total debtors 70.2 60.7 52.9 Total creditors 78.2 71.8 76.9
incl. in arrears 28.5 29.1 21.0 incl. in arrears 28.5 33.4 35.2
Receivables from
customers 58.1 47.9 40.3
Payables to
suppliers 48.4 42.7 39.1
incl. overdue 24.9 25.0 17.7 incl. overdue 21.3 21.7 16.3
Cash and bank
deposits 7.8 4.4 3.3
Payables to the
budget 6.7 10.6 14.8
incl. overdue 2.3 5.6 8.6Financial invest-
ment 2.3 4.6 6.6 Total bank credit 21.8 28.2 23.1
incl. overdue 1.7 3.6 2.9
Source: Author's calculations based on Goskomstat data
* The manufacturing sector encompasses the rest eight industrial branches.
Table A2. Signs of change of main variables in response to parameters' variation
(steady-state comparative statics). Second indexation rule.
Variable
Parameter
π x z1 f y z2 h c
g + no
change
no
change
no
change
no
change
no
change
no
change
–
θ – nochange
no
change
no
change
no
change
no
change
no
change
no
change
k
Model with symmetric sectors
cr1 + + + +
no
change
no
change
no
change
cr2 –
no
change
no
change
no
change
+ + + +
Model with asymmetric sectors
cr2 –
no
change
no
change
no
change
+ + + +
ρ – – – – nochange
no
change
no
change
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B. List of variables used in the model
Small letters denote variables in real terms and commodity prices;
capital letters denote nominal variables:
q — domestic price for sector 1 product;
p — domestic price for sector 2 product;
x — the first sector's demand for working capital;
z1 — the first sector's demand for paid for working capital;
x — the first sector's working capital actually used (i.e. x adjusted for
transactional costs);
m1 — the first sector's demand for real money balances (m1 = M1/q,
where M1 are the first sector nominal money balances);
f — the first sector's production for domestic and foreign markets
(supply) )z)mz(x()x()z,m,x(f 11111 µ−Ω=Ω= .
The production function Ω, transaction costs function µ and penalty
function ϕ are assumed to be of the following form:
).1,0(),1,0(
,)z/x(k)zx(,)z/m(a)zm(,xb)x( 111111
∈σ∈α
=ϕ=µ=Ω σνα
ξ — exports;
y — the second sector's demand for working capital;
z2 — the second sector's demand for paid for working capital;
y — the second sector's working capital actually used (i.e. y adjusted
for transactional costs);
m2 — the second sector's demand for real money balances (m2 = M2/p,
where M2 are the second sector nominal money balances);
h — the second sector's production (supply)
;)z/y(k)z/y(,)z/m(a)z/m(,yb)y(
),z)z/m(y()y()z,m,y(h
222222
22222
σνα
=ϕ=µ=Ω
µ−Ω=Ω=
c — consumer demand for the domestic consumption good;
m — consumer demand for real money balances (m = M/p, where M
are consumer's nominal money balances);
M0— consumer's money from previous period in nominal terms;
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cr1— credit limit for the first sector (cr1 = Cr1/p, where Cr1 is the first
sector limit for banking credit in nominal terms);
cr2— credit limit for the second sector (cr2 = Cr2/q, where Cr2 is the
second sector limit for banking credit in nominal terms);
R — nominal interest rate;
ρ — real interest rate;
θ — profit tax rate;
g — government demand for sector 2 product;
d — government and consumer's total demand for sector 2 product;
γ — the first sector payment ratio (1 – γ is the first sector payables
(due to the second sector) ratio);
β — the second sector payment ratio (1 – β is the second sector pay-
ables (due to the first sector) ratio);
π — the second good prices' inflation rate.
C. First-order conditions
With the parameterization and under the credit rationing regime, the first
sector (energy producer) problem can be stated as:
.mmm,crm.t.s
,crRppz)zxzx(pk)mzax(bqmax
110111
11
1
11
1
1
1
1
z,x 1
∆+==∆
−−−−−β σ−σσ−σ+αν−+ν
(18)
Note that the last term in the objective function is constant and hence
can be omitted.
Differentiating with respect to x and z1, one obtains the first order con-
ditions:
,0zxpkzx)1(pk)mazx(qb 11
1
1
1
1
1
1 =σ+σ+−−αβ σ−−σσ−σ−αν−+ν (19)
,0pzx)1(pkzxpk
mz)1)(a()mazx(qb
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
1
=−σ−+σ+
++ν−−αβ
σ−σ−σ−σ+
ν−ν−αν−+ν
(20)
.mmm,crm 110111 ∆+==∆ (21)
Define the following
.k1)1()(W,)1()(V
,)mazx(A)A,m,z,x(,p/qbA,x/z
11
1
1
1
11101
−γσ−+σγ=γσγ−γσ+=γ
−α=ψβ==γ
σ−σ−−σ−σ−
−αν−ν+
(22)
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Then we can rewrite the FOC in the form:
),(kV0 γ=ψ (19')
),(Wzm))1(a(k 11
1
0 γν+=ψ ν−ν− (20')
110111 mmm,crm ∆+==∆ , (21')
γ is the ratio of sector 1 input, which is paid for, to total demanded in-
put, and thus (1 – γ) is the arrears' ratio of sector 1.
It is easy to see that V(γ) and W(γ) are decreasing functions of γ, pro-
vided γ < 1.
Putting conditions (19') and (20') together allows one to obtain the fol-
lowing expression for z1:
( ) .m)1(a)(W/)(Vz 1/1/1/11 ν−ν−ν− ν+γγ= (23)
From (19') we have: .)zma1()A/)(kV(x 111
)1/(1 −νν−α−− γ−αγ=
Substituting z1 from (23), we get:
( ) ( )( ) .)1(a)(W/)(Va1A/)(kVx 1111)1/(1 −−−−α−− ν+γγγ−αγ= (24)
Combining (23) and (24) provides an equation for γ:
( )
( ) .A/)(kVm)1(a
)(W
)(V
a
A/)(kVm)1(a
)(W
)(V
)(
,0)(
)1/(1
1
/)1(
)1/(1
1
/1
α−
ν+ν−
α−
ν−
αγ




ν+
γ
γγ+
+αγ




ν+
γ
γ
−γ≡γΦ
=γΦ
(25)
Solving (25) for γ results in the value of γ, γ*, that maximizes the first
sector objective function, and the optimal amounts of input demanded
and paid for, i.e. x* and z1* respectively. It is proved in Appendix E1 that
Φ(γ) is an increasing function of γ, i.e. ∂Φ/∂γ > 0, provided that the elas-
ticity of V(γ)/W(γ) with respect to γ is less than one. To guarantee that
γ* < 1 (which means that it is optimal for the sector not to pay for its in-
put in full), we need to impose the following constraint on the parame-
ters:
( ) .)A/K()1(a/)k1(m
1
1
k/11
1
)1/(1/11
1
α−ν− αν+−
>
ν+
−
+ (26)
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The inequality (26) comes from the fact that Φ(γ = 1) > 0, which, to-
gether with ∂Φ/∂γ > 0, guarantees that γ* < 1. One may notice that, as
the second element on the left side of (26) is less than 0 (0 < k < 1),
when k is small (closer to 0 than to 1), the condition requires m1 to be
rather small. This implies that real money balances would have to fall
below a certain critical level to switch on arrears (provided that the pen-
alty is not large). This is consistent with the observation that the sharp
contraction of real money balances in 1992, caused by the initial price
jump and the strict credit policy, initiated the shift into quasi-money
(arrears' obligations).
It is clear from (25) that Φ(γ) depends on the parameters
m1[= m10 + cr1], A[= βqb/p] and k, and therefore γ is a function of cr1,
β, p/q and k. It is proved in the Appendix that the first sector payment
ratio γ is a decreasing function of the second sector payment ratio (β)
and an increasing function of the price ratio (p/q), the first sector credit
limit in real terms (cr1) and the penalty function coefficient (k), or the
implicit interest rate on trade credit.33
The first sector input paid for (z1) is a decreasing function of γ, while the
input demanded (x) is an increasing function of γ. As a result, the first
sector demand for working capital, paid for input and output increase
when the second sector payment ratio increases or the first sector
credit limit is relaxed, and decrease when the price ratio deteriorates for
the sector or the penalty for having arrears increases.
The second (manufacturing) sector problem is symmetric to the first
sector's if we assume:
.)z/y(k)z/y(,)z/m(a)z/m(,yb)y( 222222
σνα
=ϕ=µ=Ω
With the parameterization, the manufacturing sector problem can be
stated as:
.mmm,q/Crm.t.s
,mqRqz
)zyzy(kq)mazy(bpmax
220222
22
1
22
1
2
1
2z,m,y 22
∆+=≤∆
∆−−
−−−−γ σ−σσ−σ+αν−+ν
∆
(27)
                                               
33  The higher the penalty function coefficient, the higher the implicit interest rate
on trade credit, i.e. (pk(1/γ)σ – 1) in terms of the first sector and (qk(1/β)σ – 1) in
terms of the second sector.
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The first order conditions for the second sector maximization problem
(when credit rationing is binding) are symmetric to the first sector FOCs:
,mmm,crm
),(W~zm)1(ak~
220222
22
11
0
∆+==∆
βν+=ψ ν−ν−−
(28)
where ,y/z2=β  ,q/bpA~ γ=  ,)mazy(A~)A~,m,z,y(~ 1212220 −αν−ν+−α=ψ
,)1()(V~ 1 σ−σ− βσ−βσ+=β  .k/1)1()(W~ )1( −βσ−+βσ=β σ−σ+−
β is the ratio of sector 2 input, which is paid for, to total demanded in-
put, and thus (1 – β) is the arrears' ratio of sector 2. To guarantee that
β* < 1 we need to impose a similar constraint on parameters as in (26).
Like the energy sector, manufacturing sector non-payments are
switched on by its real money balances being below some critical level
(given that the penalty coefficient is not large).
Similar to the procedure used above, we can establish that β is a de-
creasing function of the first sector payment ratio (γ) and the price ratio
(p/q), and an increasing function of the credit limit for the second sector
in real terms (cr2) and the penalty function coefficient (k).
Table C1 summarizes the main results of the partial equilibrium analysis.
The first order conditions for the consumer's maximization problem are
standard. Assuming that goods are normal, and given the gross substi-
tutability assumption, the resulting demand functions for the domestic
consumption good c and real money balances m depend negatively on
their own price and positively on income.
Given the assumptions made about the functions f, h, ϕ, µ and U, and
assuming that substitution effect caused by the price ratio change is
stronger than the income effect34, an equilibrium exists and is unique.
D. Two-sector model with credit rationing (without arrears)
Suppose that there are still transaction costs of buying working capital,
but there is no possibility to hold payment arrears (e.g., they are strictly
prosecuted legally35), so that now (in terms of the first sector) x = z1
                                               
34  This would guarantee that the demand function defined below depends nega-
tively on the price ratio p/q.
35  Another way to introduce the impossibility of running payment arrears is to
make σ → ∞ (i.e. to drive the penalty to infinity), so that again x = z1 and y = z2.
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and actual demand for input is x)m/x(xx 1µ−= . In this case (and un-
der binding credit rationing) the first sector problem can be written as:
.mmm,crm.t.s
,xp)mxax(bqmax
t11t1t1t1t1
ttt1
1
ttt
x t
∆+==∆
−−
−
αν−+ν
(29)
Actual demand for input is now tt1ttt x)m/x(xx µ−= .
The first order conditions of the problem (under the first indexation rule)
are:
,0)1()xmxa1()mxa1(bxq~ ttt1t
1
t1t
1
t0 =π+−+−−α
ν−ν−αν−ν−α (30)
.mmm,crm t11t1t1t1t1 ∆+==∆ − (31)
It can be shown that (under standard assumptions about the production
function, which are translated here into restrictions on parameters) the
demand for working capital and output of the first sector are positive
functions of the credit limit to the sector and negative functions of the
inflation ratio 0q~/)1( π+ . Symmetrically, the second sector's demand for
working capital and output are positive functions of the credit limit to the
second sector and of the inflation ratio.
As a result, the supply function depends on parameters in the following
way:
).cr,cr,q~/)1((SS 210
+−+
π+= (32)
Table C1. Signs of partial derivatives of main variables with respect to parame-
ters (partial equilibrium analysis).
Variable
Parameter
x z1 x f y z2 y h ξ ds
γ + – + + + + + + ? ?
β + + + + + – + + ? ?
p/q – – – – + + + + – +
cr1 + + + + + –
cr2 + + + + – +
k – – – – – – – – ? ?
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It can be shown that demand depends on parameters in the following
fashion:
).cr,cr,,q~/~,q~/)1(,g(DD 21000
−+−+−+
Θεπ+= (33)
Hence, there is no difference in the direction of change (under pa-
rameters' variation) in comparison with the model with arrears. However,
in the model without arrears, a credit limit relaxation directly affects the
(actual) demand for working capital, and therefore, output, i.e.
11 cr
x
x
f
cr
f
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
(in the first sector variables). In the model with payment arrears the ef-
fect is indirect: a change in the credit limit, and thus real money bal-
ances, is translated into a changed level of the sector's payment ratio,
and the payment ratio change affects the demand for working capital
and output, i.e.
11 cr
x
x
f
cr
f
∂
∂γ
∂γ
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
.
Therefore, the comparative strength of initiated (by changes in credit
limit) supply-side reactions in the two models depends on the magni-
tudes of the respective elasticities. The latter is likely to depend on the
characteristics of the production and transaction cost functions, and the
level of real money balances. It is difficult to draw an unambiguous con-
clusion about the comparative magnitude of the respective elasticities
analytically.
However, one may expect arrears to exert a "cushioning" effect on the
supply-side reaction. In the presence of transaction costs, a decrease in
the credit limit to a sector (following monetary tightening) causes a de-
cline in the actual demand for input x . When there is no alternative
source of liquidity (which would lessen transaction costs) the resulting
decrease in x , and therefore f, may be high. Payment arrears provide a
way to diminish transaction costs, and therefore allow to counteract the
adverse influence of credit tightening. Hence, the resulting decrease in
x , and therefore f, is likely to be less than in the absence of arrears.
The result is true in a certain region where the costs of increasing ar-
rears (i.e., the penalties) are still less than the benefits (i.e., the de-
crease in transaction costs).
An increase in the credit limit to a sector results in the increase of the
actual demand for input x  (via decreasing transaction costs). In the
presence of arrears, the relaxation of the credit limit to a sector in-
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creases the payment ratio, which in turn increases the actual demand
for input x . It is likely that when the payment ratio is very low, the re-
laxation of the credit limit may cause a substantial increase in the pay-
ment ratio, and consequently a substantial increase in output. When γ is
high, the resulting change in the payment ratio may not be high.36
Hence, given the non-linearities of the relationships under consideration,
it is difficult to draw an unambiguous conclusion about the comparative
magnitude of the initiated supply side reaction analytically. If the elastic-
ity of payment arrears with respect to credit is less than one, i.e. (in
terms of the first sector variables)
1
cr
cr
1
1
<
γ∂
∂γ
,
one may expect arrears to have a "cushioning" effect. Empirical analysis
may help in this respect.
E. Proofs
E1. Let us prove that ∂Φ/∂γ > 0.
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36  This could be the case (when the payment ratio is high) when increased real
money balances make it profitable not to run payment arrears and therefore to
pay in full.
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It is easy to see that ∂Φ/∂γ  >  0, since γ  <  1, ∂V(γ)Φ/∂γ  >  0,
( ) 0)(W/)(V >∂γγγ∂ , and ( ) 0)1()(W/)(V1 11 >ν+γγγ− −− , and assuming
that the elasticity of V(γ)/W(γ) with respect to γ is less than one, a suffi-
cient condition for which is:
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E2. Let us prove that ∂Φ/∂A > 0, ∂Φ/∂m1 < 0, ∂Φ/∂k < 0.
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Since ( ) 0)1()(W/)(V1 11 >ν+γγγ− −− , ∂Φ/∂A > 0.
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Since ( ) 0)1()(W/)(V1 11 >ν+γγγ− −− , ∂Φ/∂m1 < 0.
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Since ( ) 0)1()(W/)(V1 11 >ν+γγγ− −− , ∂Φ/∂k < 0.
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E3. Let us prove that ∂x/∂β > 0, ∂x/∂(p/q) < 0, ∂x/∂m1 > 0, ∂x/∂k < 0
and ∂z1/∂β > 0, ∂z1/∂(p/q) < 0, ∂z1/∂m1 > 0, ∂z1/∂k < 0.
x depends on m1 only through γ, and on A and k — both trough γ and
directly. z1 depends on A and k only through γ, and on m1 — both via γ
and directly. Using the fact that ,/zx 1 γ=  γ= xz1  and that
,0
m
x
m
x
11
>
∂
∂γ
∂γ
∂
=
∂
∂
  ,0
A
z
A
z 11 >
∂
∂γ
∂γ
∂
=
∂
∂
  ,0
k
z
k
z 11 <
∂
∂γ
∂γ
∂
=
∂
∂
we have:
,0
m
x
x
mm
z
111
1 >
∂
∂γ+
∂
∂γ
=
∂
∂
,0
A
z
A
z
A
x 2
1
1 >γ



∂
∂γ
−γ
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
−
.0
k
z
k
z
k
x 2
1
1 <γ



∂
∂γ
−γ
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
−
E4. Let us prove that ∂f/∂β > 0, ∂f/∂(p/q) < 0, ∂f/∂m1 > 0, ∂f/∂k < 0.
The first sector output is ( ),z)m/z(x)x(f 111µ−Ω=Ω=  where x  is actual
(i.e. net of transaction costs) production input. ,0x/ >∂Ω∂  and thereby
the signs of the derivatives of f with respect to β, p/q, m1 and k will co-
incide with the signs of the derivatives of x  with respect to β, p/q, m1
and k.
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and since x  depends on m1 only through γ
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i.e. the elasticity of V(γ) with respect to γ and the elasticity of γ with re-
spect to A in absolute terms are less than one.
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i.e. the elasticity of V(γ) with respect to γ and the elasticity of γ with re-
spect to k in absolute terms are less than one.
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It is convenient to write the budget constraint in the form
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Using the balance condition: D = d = g + c(p/q, I/q).
It is obvious that ∂d/∂g > 0, ∂d/∂θ < 0, ∂d/∂(M0/q) > 0.
The influence of γ, β, and k on demand is ambiguous due to the ambi-
guity of the variables' effect on the export function ξ. An increase in real
credit limits to the first sector (cr1) increases income through ξ and γ,
thus raising demand. A relaxation of real credit limit to the second sec-
tor cr2 decreases ξ, thus diminishing income and demand.
The sign of ∂d/∂(p/q) depends on the relative strength of the income
and substitution effects:
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Provided that c is a normal good and assuming that the substitution ef-
fect is stronger than the income effect, ∂D/∂(p/q) < 0.
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